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In 1964, the CIA advised the Warren Commission that the Agency never had a relationship of any kind with Lee Harvey Oswald. Testifying before the Commission, John A. McCone, who was then Director of Central Intelligence, indicated that Oswald "was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him directly or in any other manner...Oswald was never associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency." \_\_\_/ McCone's testimony was corroborated by Richard M. Helms, then the Agency's Deputy Director for Plans and therefore the person directly responsible for clandestine operations. \_\_\_/ Once these assurances had been received, \_\_\_/ the record reflects no

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further efforts by the Warren Commission to investigate  
this matter.

The Committee sought to resolve the issue of Oswald's  
alleged association with the CIA by conducting an inquiry  
that went beyond the threshold level of obtaining statements  
from two of the Agency's most senior officials. Instead,  
a more analytical investigative approach was utilized.  
First, an effort was made to identify circumstances either  
in Oswald's life or in the manner in which his case was  
handled by the CIA which were potentially suggestive of an  
intelligence association of some kind. Then, an intensive  
file review was undertaken which included both the CIA's  
144-volume Oswald file and hundreds of others from the CIA,  
as well as the FBI, State Department, and the Department of  
Defense. \_\_\_/ Based upon these file reviews, a series of

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interviews, depositions, and executive session hearings were conducted with both Agency and non-Agency witnesses. The contacts with present and former CIA personnel covered a broad range of individuals, including staff and division chiefs, clandestine case officers, area desk officers, research analysts, secretaries, and clerical assistants. In total, more than 125 persons, including at least 50 present and former CIA employees, were questioned regarding this issue.

The results of this investigation confirmed the Warren Commission testimony given by Messrs. McCone and Helms. There was no indication in Oswald's CIA file suggestive in any way that he had ever had any contact with the Agency. Moreover, the Agency employees who would have been in a position to know if Oswald had been associated with the CIA uniformly denied that he had been an agent

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or connected with the CIA in any other capacity. \_\_\_/

Finally, taken in their entirety, the items of circumstantial evidence that the Committee had selected for investigation as possibly indicative of an intelligence association did not support the allegation that Oswald had an intelligence agency relationship of some kind.

This finding, however, must be qualified because the same institutional characteristics, in terms of the Agency's extreme compartmentalization and the complexity of its enormous filing system, that are designed to preclude penetration by foreign powers have the simultaneous effect of making Congressional inquiry very difficult. For example, CIA personnel testified to the Committee that a review of Agency files will not always indicate whether an individual was affiliated with the Agency in any respect. Nor was there always an independent means of verifying that all

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materials requested from the Agency were, in fact, provided. Accordingly, any finding which is essentially negative in nature, such as that Lee Harvey Oswald was neither associated with the CIA in any way nor ever even in contact with that institution, cannot be rendered in absolute terms.

To the extent possible, however, the Committee's investigation was designed to overcome the Agency's institutional obstacles that potentially impede effective external scrutiny of the CIA. The vast majority of CIA files made available to the Committee were reviewed in unsanitized form. These files were evaluated both for their substantive content and for any potential procedural irregularities suggestive of possible tampering. After review, the files were used as the basis for examination and cross-examination of present and former Agency

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employees. Because of the number of Agency personnel who  
were queried, it is highly probable that any significant  
inconsistencies between the files and the witnesses'  
responses would have been established.

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SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

1. CIA Personnel in the Soviet Russia Division

In addition to obtaining testimony from former directors John H. McCone and Richard M. Helms, the Committee interviewed individuals who were chiefs of the CIA's Soviet Russia division during 1959-1963.\* These individuals categorically denied that Oswald had ever been associated in any capacity with the CIA.

To investigate this matter further, the persons who had been chiefs and/or deputy chiefs during 1959-62 of the three units within the Soviet Russia division which were responsible respectively for clandestine activities,

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\*The chief(s) of the Soviet Russia division from August 1962 to September 1963 was not interviewed by the Committee.

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American legal travelers, and research in support of clandestine activities.\* The heads of the clandestine activity section stated during this period the CIA had very few operatives in the Soviet Union and that Oswald was not one of them. Moreover, they stated that because of his obvious instability, Oswald would never have met the Agency's standards for use in the field.\*\* The heads of the

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\*For the unit that was responsible for American legal travelers, only the years 1959-61 were covered. However, since every American legal traveler who was involved in this program was recruited before his trip to the Soviet Union, the relevant year for Lee Harvey Oswald was 1959 because that is when he departed from the United States.

\*\*One officer acknowledges the remote possibility that an individual could be run by someone as part of a "vest pocket" operation without other Agency officials knowing about it, but even this possibility, as it applies to Oswald, was negated by the statement of the deputy chief of the Soviet Russia clandestine activities section who commented that in 1963 he was involved in a review of every clandestine operation ever run in the Soviet Union, and that Oswald was not involved in any of these cases.

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Soviet Russia division's American Legal Traveler program, which utilized Americans traveling in the Soviet Union as a means of obtaining information and identifying possible subjects for recruitment, informed the Committee that they met with each person involved in this activity and that Oswald was not one of them. These Agency officials also advised the Committee that only "clean-cut" college graduates were used in this program, and that Oswald did not meet this criteria. Finally, the Agency officers in charge of the Soviet Russia division's research section in support of clandestine activities indicated that, had Oswald been contacted by the Agency, their section would probably have been informed, but that this, in fact, never occurred.

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2. CIA Personnel (in Tokyo) (Japan)

The Committee investigated the allegation of former CIA employee James Wilcott, who testified in executive session that shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy he was advised by fellow employees at the CIA's <sup>13</sup> (Tokyo Station) that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent who had received financial disbursements under an assigned cryptonym. Wilcott explained that he had been employed by the CIA as a finance officer from 1957 until his resignation from the Agency in 1966. In this capacity, he served as a fiscal account assistant on the support staff <sup>13-</sup> (at the Tokyo Station) from June of 1960 to June 1964. Wilcott advised that in addition to his regular responsibilities, he had served security duty on his off-hours in order to supplement his income. This additional job put him in contact with

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other employees of the <sup>13</sup> [Tokyo Station] who would come by the  
office and engage in informal conversations regarding  
politics and their work.

Wilcott told the Committee that on the day after President  
Kennedy's assassination, he was informed by a CIA case  
officer that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent. Wilcott  
further testified that he was told that Oswald had been  
assigned a cryptonym and that Wilcott himself had  
unknowingly disbursed payments for Oswald's project using  
that cryptonym. Although Wilcott was unable to identify the  
specific case officers who had initially informed him of  
Oswald's Agency relationship, he named several employees  
of the <sup>13</sup> [Tokyo Station] with whom he believed he had subsequently  
discussed the allegations.

Wilcott advised the Committee that after learning

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of the alleged Oswald connection to the CIA, he had never  
rechecked the <sup>13</sup> [Tokyo Station] disbursement records for  
evidence of the Oswald project. He explained that this was  
because at that time he viewed the information as mere shop  
talk and gave it little credence. Neither did he report  
the allegations to any formal investigative bodies following  
the assassination as he considered the information to be hearsay.

In an attempt to investigate Wilcott's allegations  
concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the CIA, the  
Committee interviewed several present and former CIA  
employees who were selected on the basis of the position each  
had held with the CIA during the years 1954-1964. Among  
those persons interviewed were individuals whose responsibilities  
covered a broad spectrum of areas within the <sup>13</sup> [Tokyo Station]  
during this period, including the chief and deputy chief <sup>08</sup> [of]

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[station] as well as officers in finance, registry, the Soviet  
Branch and counterintelligence. \_\_\_/ The Committee's  
investigation refuted Wilcott's allegation.

During the course of their employment in the <sup>12</sup>[Tokyo  
Station] none of these individuals interviewed had ever seen  
any documents or heard any information indicating that Lee  
Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent. \_\_\_/ This allegation was not  
known to anyone until the time of publication of Warren  
Commission critical literature and the Garrison investigation  
in the late 1960's. \_\_\_/ Some of the individuals, including  
the chief of counterintelligence within the Soviet Russia  
Branch <sup>12</sup>[in Tokyo], expressed the belief that it was possible  
that Lee Harvey Oswald had been recruited by the KGB  
during his military tour of duty in Japan as the CIA's

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[Tokyo Station] had identified a KGB program aimed at recruiting

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U.S. military personnel in Tokyo during the period that  
Oswald was stationed there. An intelligence analyst whom  
Wilcott had specifically named as having been involved,  
following the assassination, in a conversation regarding  
the Oswald-CIA agent allegation told the Committee that he  
was not in the <sup>B</sup> [Tokyo Station] at that time. A review of this  
individual's Office of Personnel file confirmed that, in  
fact, he had been transferred from the <sup>B</sup> [Tokyo Station] to the  
United States in 1962.

The chief of the <sup>B</sup> [Tokyo Station] from 1961-1965 stated  
that, had Oswald been used by the Agency within their  
jurisdiction, they certainly would have known about it.  
Similarly, almost all those persons interviewed who worked  
in the Soviet Russia branch <sup>DB</sup> [of that station] indicated that  
they would have known if Lee Harvey Oswald had, in fact,

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been recruited as a CIA agent when he was in Japan. \_\_\_/

These persons expressed the opinion that had Oswald been  
recruited without their knowledge, it would have been a rare  
exception contrary to the working policy and guidelines of  
the <sup>13</sup> [Tokyo Station.]

3. Lee Harvey Oswald's CIA File

The CIA has long acknowledged that, prior to the  
President's assassination, it had a personality file on  
Lee Harvey Oswald. This file, which in Agency terminology  
is referred to as a 201 file, was opened on December 9, 1960.  
The Agency has explained to the Committee that 201 files are  
opened when a person is considered to be of potential  
intelligence or counterintelligence significance. The  
opening of such a file is designed to serve the purpose of  
bringing all of the CIA's information pertaining to that

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individual into one centralized records system belonging  
to the Deputy Directorate for Operations, that component  
of the Agency responsible for clandestine activities.

The existence of a 201 file does not necessarily  
connote any actual relationship or contact with the CIA.  
For example, the Oswald file was purportedly opened  
because he was considered to be a potential counterintelligence  
threat. Oswald's file contained absolutely no indication that  
he had ever had any relationship with the CIA. Nevertheless,  
because the Committee was aware of at least one instance  
(in an unrelated case) where an Agency officer had apparently  
contemplated the use of faked files with forged documents, \_\_\_/  
special attention was given to procedural questions that were  
occasioned by this file review.

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- a) Why was Oswald's 201 file opened on December 9, 1960,  
more than a year after his attempt to defect to the  
Soviet Union?

A confidential State Department telegram dated  
October 31, 1959, which was sent from Moscow to the CIA,  
reported that Lee Harvey Oswald, a recently discharged  
marine, had appeared at the United States Moscow embassy  
to renounce his American citizenship and "has offered  
Soviets any information he has acquired as /an/ enlisted  
radar operator."   /   At least three other communications of  
a confidential nature which gave more detail on the Oswald  
case were apparently\* sent to the CIA during the same

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\*Two of these documents, Warren Commission Exhibits 917 and  
918, contained routing notations indicating that they had been  
sent to the CIA, but the documents themselves were never  
found in Oswald's file.

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approximate time period. \_\_\_/ Agency officials questioned by  
the Committee have testified that the substance of the  
October 31, 1959 cable was sufficiently important to warrant  
the opening of a 201 file. In fact, however, Oswald's file  
was not opened until December 9, 1960.

The CIA was requested by the Committee to indicate  
where documents pertaining to Oswald had been disseminated  
internally and stored prior to the opening of his 201 file.  
In response, the Agency advised the Committee that because  
document dissemination records of low national security  
significance are retained for only a five-year period, they  
are no longer in existence for the years 1959-1963. \_\_\_/  
Consequently, the Agency was unable to explain either when  
these documents had been received or by which component.

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An Agency memorandum, dated September 18, 1975,  
indicates that Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1960  
by virtue of the receipt of five documents: two from the  
FBI, two from the State Department, and one from the Navy. /  
This reasoning, however, is inconsistent with the presence  
in Oswald's file of four State Department documents dated in  
1959 and a fifth dated May 25, 1960. It is, of course,  
possible that the September 18, 1975 memorandum is referring  
to State Department documents that were received by the DDO  
in October and November of 1960 and that the earlier State  
Department communications had been received by the CIA's  
Office of Security but not the DDO. In the absence of  
dissemination records, however, the issue cannot be  
resolved on this basis.

The September 18, 1975 memorandum also states that

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Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1960 as a result of his "defection" to the USSR on 10/31/59 and renewed interest in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning possible reentry into the United States." \_\_\_/ There is no indication, however, that Oswald expressed any intention of returning to any United States government official until mid-February of 1961. Finally, reference to the original form that was used to start a file on Oswald does not resolve this issue because the appropriate slot which would normally indicate the "source document" that initiated the action makes reference to an Agency component rather than to a dated document.

The Committee was able to determine the basis for the opening of Oswald's file on December 9, 1960 by interviewing and then deposing the Agency employee who was directly responsible for initiating the opening action. This individual

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xplained that the CIA had received a request from the State  
Department for information concerning American defectors.

After compiling the requested information, she responded  
to the inquiry and then opened a 201 file on each defector  
involved. \_\_\_/

This statement was corroborated by review of State  
Department which indicated that such a request, in fact, had  
been made of the CIA on October 25, 1960. Attached to the  
State Department letter was a list of known defectors;  
Lee Harvey Oswald's name was on that list. \_\_\_/ The CIA  
responded to this request on November 21, 1960 by providing  
the requested information and adding two names to the  
State Department's original list.

Significantly, the Committee reviewed the files of  
eleven individuals on the original State Department list

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and determined that the files for each of the five (including Oswald) who did not have Agency (201) files prior to the receipt of the State Department inquiry were opened in December 1960. In each case, the slot for "source document" made reference to the same Agency component rather than to a dated document.

Even so, this analysis only explains why a file on Oswald was finally opened; standing alone it does not explain the seemingly long delay in the opening of the file. To determine whether such a delayed opening was necessarily unusual, the Committee reviewed the files of 13 of the 14 persons on the CIA's November 21, 1960 response to the State Department and of 16 other defectors (from an original list of 380) who were American born, had defected during the years 1958-1963, and who had returned to the United States

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during that same time period. Of 29 files that were reviewed, eight individuals had been the subject of 201 files prior to the time of their defection. In only four of the remaining twenty-one cases were 201 files opened at the time of defection. The files on the 17 other defectors were opened from four months to several years after the time of defection.

At the very least, this file review indicated that during 1958-63 the opening of a file years after a defection was not at all uncommon. In many cases the opening was triggered by some event, independent of the defection, which drew attention to the individual involved.

- b) Why was Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file opened under the name Lee Henry Oswald?

Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file was mistakenly opened under the name Lee Henry Oswald. No Agency witness was able

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specifically to explain how this mistake was made. All Agency personnel, however, including the person who initiated the file opening, testified that this must have been occasioned innocently by bureaucratic error. Moreover, the Committee received substantial testimony to the effect that this error would not have prevented Oswald's name from being elicited from the CIA's filing system during a routine name trace done under the name Lee Henry Oswald.

- c) What do the letters "AG," which are written in the space for "Other Identification" on Oswald's 201 opening form, connote?

The form used to initiate the opening of a 201 file for Lee Harvey Oswald contains the designation AG in a box marked "Other Identification." Because this term was considered to be of potential significance in resolving the issue of Oswald's alleged Agency relationship, the CIA was asked to

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explain its meaning.

The Agency's response indicated that "AG" is the OI ("Other Identification") code meaning "actual or potential defectors to the East or the SINO/SOVIET Bloc including Cuba," and that anyone so described could have the OI code "AG." This code was reportedly added to Oswald's opening form because of the comment on the form that he had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959.

An Agency official who was a DDO records expert and for many years had been involved in the CIA's investigative efforts concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination, gave the Committee a somewhat different explanation of the circumstances surrounding the term "AG" and its placement on Oswald's opening form. This individual testified that "AG" was an example of a code used to aid in preparing computer listings of occupational groupings or intelligence affiliations.

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He explained that these codes always utilized two letters and that in this case, the first letter "A" must have represented Communism, while the second letter would represent some category within the Communist structure.

His recollection was that at the time of the assassination the "AG" code was not yet in existence because there were no provisions then in effect within the Agency for the indexing of American defectors. He recalled that it was only during the life of the Warren Commission that the CIA realized that its records system lacked provisions for indexing an individual such as Oswald. Consequently, the CIA then revised its records handbook to include authorization for indexing American defectors and established a code for its computer system to be used for the category of "American defectors." Although this individual did not know when the

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notation "AG" was added to Oswald's opening sheet, he presumed that it would have to have been following the addition of the American defector code, thus placing the time somewhere in the middle of the Warren Commission's investigation. He explained that it was difficult to determine when any of the notations on the opening sheet were made, since it was standard procedure to update the forms whenever necessary so that they were as reflective as possible of the available information.

Finally, this individual testified that the regulations regarding the use of this occupation and intelligence code specifically prohibited indicating that a particular person was either an employee of the Agency or someone who was used by the Agency. \_\_/ This prohibition was designed to prevent anyone from being able to produce any kind of categorical listing of CIA employees, contacts, or connections. \_\_/

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- d) Why does the opening form for Lee Harvey Oswald's  
201 file indicate that the file was to be restricted?

The form that was used to initiate the opening of Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file contains a notation indicating that the file was to be "restricted." This indication was considered potentially significant because of the CIA's practice of restricting agents' files to persons on a "need to know" basis.

Further investigation, however, revealed that restricting access to a file was not necessarily indicative of any relationship with the CIA.

The individual who actually placed the restriction on Oswald's file testified that this was done simply to allow her to remain aware of any developments that might have occurred with regard to the file. This purpose was achieved because any person seeking access to the file first had to

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notify the restricting officer; at that time the restricting officer could be apprised of any developments possibly necessitating access to the file by someone else.

This testimony was confirmed by a CIA records expert who further testified that, had the file been permanently changed as well as restricted, the possibility of a relationship with the CIA would have been greater. There was no indication on Oswald's form that it had been placed on permanent change.

Finally, the Committee reviewed the files of four other defectors which had been opened at the same time and by the same person as Oswald's, and determined that each of their files had similarly been restricted. Each of these other individuals had been on the list of defectors that had been exchanged by the CIA and State Department. None of the files pertaining to these other defectors had any evidence suggestive

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of a possible intelligence agency association.

- e) Were 37 documents missing from Lee Harvey Oswald's  
201 file?

In the course of reviewing Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, the Committee discovered an unsigned memorandum to the Chief of Counterintelligence, Research and Analysis, dated 20 February 1964, which stated that 37 documents were missing from Oswald's 201 file. According to the memorandum, this statement was based upon a comparison of a machine listing of documents officially recorded as being in the 201 file and those documents actually physically available in the file. While the memorandum mentioned that such a machine listing was attached, no such attachment was found in the 201 file at the time of the Committee's review. The memorandum itself bears the classification "SECRET EYES ONLY," and is one of the

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documents that had been fully withheld from release under the  
Freedom of Information review.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA advised  
that because Oswald's file was so active during the course of  
the Warren Commission investigation, up-to-date machine listings  
were produced periodically. On this basis, the Agency stated  
that "it must be assumed that whoever was responsible for  
maintaining the Oswald file brought this file up-to-date by  
locating the 37 documents and placing them in the file."

Because this response was incomplete, the author of  
this memorandum was deposed. He testified that once a  
document had been registered into a 201 file by the Agency's  
computer system, physical placement of the document in the  
file was not always necessary. On this basis, he explained  
that the items listed in the memorandum were not missing but

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rather had either been routinely placed in a separate file because of their sensitivity or were being held by other individuals who needed them for analytical purposes. He further stated that in the course of his custodianship of Oswald's file, he had requested perhaps as many as 100 computer listings on the contents of the Oswald file. While there had been many instances in which one or more documents had been charged out to someone, he stated that he had never discovered that any documents were actually missing. According to his testimony, the 37 documents, in fact, were available, but simply were not located in the file at that time.

- f) Was there any evidence that the CIA had for some reason maintained a dual filing system regarding Lee Harvey Oswald?

Although the Committee was aware from its outset of the possibility that a dual filing system -- using one

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ostensibly innocuous file and one which contained the actual operational detail indicative of an Agency relationship with the CIA -- could be utilized to disguise the existence of an actual relationship between an individual and the CIA, this awareness heightened into a concern with the discovery of certain files which indicated that at least two Agency officers had contemplated the use of fake files and forged documents to protect the purpose of the ZR Rifle project from being disclosed. The ZR Rifle project was an executive action (i.e., assassination) program which bore no relation to the Oswald case. Richard Helms testified that the assassinations aspect of this project was never implemented and, in fact, was discontinued as soon as it was brought to his attention, \_\_\_/ but the implications of this discovery in terms of the potentiality for a faked Oswald file were troubling.

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In the Oswald case, there were two items which received scrutiny because they were potentially indicative of a dual filing system. The first involved a photograph of him that had been taken in Minsk in 1961 and the second concerned a copy of a letter that had been written to him by his mother during his stay in the Soviet Union. At the time of President Kennedy's assassination, both of these items were in the CIA's possession but neither was in Oswald's 201 file.

The photograph of Oswald taken in Minsk shows him posing with several other people. According to the CIA, the picture was found after the assassination as a result of a search of the Agency's graphics files for materials potentially relevant to Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union. \_\_\_/ The Agency advised that this photograph, as well as several others not related to Oswald, were routinely obtained in

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1962 from some tourists by the CIA's Domestic Contacts  
Division, a component that frequently sought information on  
a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad in  
Communist countries.

Committee interviews with the tourists in question  
confirmed that the photograph, along with 159 other  
photographic slides, had been made routinely available to the  
Agency's Domestic Contacts Division. Neither tourist had  
heard of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination or even  
knew which photographs had been of interest to the Agency.

CIA records indicate that only five of the 160 slides  
initially made available were retained. \_\_\_/ Committee  
interviews with the two CIA employees who had handled the  
slides for the Domestic Contacts Division established that  
Oswald had not been identified at the time that these

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photographic materials had been made available. \_\_\_/ One  
of these employees stated that the Oswald picture had been  
retained because it depicted a Soviet intourist guide; the  
other employee indicated that the picture had been kept  
because it showed a crane in the background. \_\_\_/ The  
employee who worked at CIA headquarters confirmed that the  
photograph of Oswald had not been discovered until a post-  
assassination search of the Minsk graphics file for materials  
pertaining to Oswald.

Accordingly, this photograph is not evidence that the  
CIA maintained a dual filing system with respect to Oswald.  
The picture apparently was kept in a separate file only until  
1964 when Oswald was actually identified to be one of its  
subjects.

The Committee's investigation of a letter concerning

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Oswald that was in the Agency's possession similarly did not result in any evidence of a dual filing system. This letter, dated July 6, 1961, had been sent to Marguerite Oswald to her son, but was intercepted as a result of a CIA mail intercept program. \_\_\_/ This program, known as HT-Lingual, attempted to intercept letters being sent between the United States and Russia in an effort to obtain both positive intelligence and counterintelligence information. \_\_\_/ Typically, intercepted letters and/or their envelopes would be photographed and then returned to the mails.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA explained that because of the project's extreme sensitivity, all materials generated as a result of mail intercepts were stored in a separate project's file which was maintained by the counterintelligence staff. \_\_\_/ Consequently, such items were

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not placed in 201 files. This explanation was confirmed by  
the testimony of a senior officer from the counterintelligence  
staff who had jurisdiction over the HT-Lingual project files.\* \_\_/

- g) Was there any evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald had  
ever participated in a CIA counterintelligence  
staff project?

The Committee's review of HT-Lingual files pertaining  
to Oswald\*\* resulted in the discovery of reproductions of four  
index cards, two pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald and two


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\*Since Oswald was the subject in approximately 50 communications  
during his stay in the Soviet Union, the Committee also  
questioned why the Agency—ostensibly had just one letter  
in its possession directly related to Lee Harvey Oswald.  
In essence, this may be explained by the fact that HT-Lingual  
only operated four days a week and even then only on a  
sampling basis. \_\_/

\*\*Although the Agency had only one letter in its possession  
directly related to Oswald, after the assassination the  
HT-Lingual files were combed for additional materials potential  
related to him. Approximately 50 pieces of correspondence were  
discovered. None of these were ultimately judged to be of any  
significance. These materials, however, were stored in a  
separate Oswald HT-Lingual file.

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pertaining to Marina Oswald, which were dated after the  
assassination of President Kennedy. The pages containing the  
reproductions of these cards are stamped "Secret Eyes Only."

The first card regarding Lee Harvey Oswald is dated  
9 November 1959 and states that Oswald is a recent defector to  
the USSR and a former Marine. It also bears the notation  
"CI/Project/RE" and some handwritten notations. The second  
card on Oswald places him in Minsk, USSR. It contains  
background information on him and states that he "reportedly  
expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain  
conditions." This card is dated 7 August 1961 and also bears  
the notation "WATCH LIST." These cards, particularly the  
reference to "CI/Project/RE," raised the question of whether  
Lee Harvey Oswald was, in fact, involved in some sort of CI  
project.

The Committee questioned former employees of the CIA who

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may have had some knowledge pertaining to the HT-Lingual program in general and these cards in particular. Some of these employees recognized the cards as relating to the HT-Lingual project, but were unable to identify the meaning of the notation, "CI/Project/RE."

However, one person testified that the "CI Project" was "simply a name of convenience which was used to describe the HT-Lingual project"; another person testified that "CI Project" was the name of the component which ran the HT-Lingual project. The latter explained that "RE" represented the initials of a person who had been a translator of foreign language documents and that the initials had probably been placed there so that someone could come back to the translator if a question arose concerning one of the documents. \_\_/

Another employee testified that the "Watch-List" notation on

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the second card referred to a list of persons who had been identified as being of particular interest in the Agency with respect to the mail intercept program.

The Committee requested the CIA to provide an explanation for the terms "CI/Project/RE," and "Watch List," and for the significance of the handwritten notations appearing on the index cards. In addition, the Committee requested a description of criteria utilized in compiling a "watch list."

In regard to the meaning of the notation "CI/Project/RE," the CIA explained that there existed an office within the Counterintelligence staff that was known as "CI/Project," a cover title that had been used to hide the true nature of the office's functions. In fact, this office was responsible for the exploitation of the material produced by the HT-Lingual project. The response further explains that "RE" represents

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the initials of a former employee who is presently retired under  
cover.

In responding to a request for the criteria used in  
compiling a "Watch List," the CIA referred to a section of  
the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities  
within the United States, which states:

Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence  
interest (one should also add counterintelligence  
interest) were specified in Watch Lists provided  
to the mail project by the Counterintelligence Staff,  
by other CIA components, and by the FBI. The total  
number of names on the Watch List varied, from time  
to time, but on the average, the list included  
approximately 300 names, including about 100 furnished  
by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of  
foreigners and of United States citizens.

Thus, the full meaning of the notation is that on  
9 November 1959, RE placed Oswald's name on the "Watch List"  
for the HT-Lingual project for the reason stated on the card --  
that Oswald was a recent defector to the USSR and a former  
Marine.

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The response goes on to state that the handwritten number, #7-305, which also appears on the first card, is a reference to the communication from the CI Staff to the Office of Security expressing the former's interest in seeing any mail to or from Oswald in the Soviet Union. Finally, the other handwritten notation, "N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59," signifies that a name trace run through the central records register indicates that there was no record for Lee Oswald as per that date.

The Agency's explanation of the meaning of the second card is that on 7 August 1961, Mrs. Egerter requested that Oswald's name be placed on the "Watch List" because of Oswald's expressed desire to return to the U.S. as stated on the card. The handwritten notation indicates, in this instance, that Oswald's name was deleted from the "Watch List" on 28 May 1961.

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In reference to the two cards on Marina Oswald, the Agency stated that her name was first placed on the "Watch List" on 26 November 1963 because she was the wife of Lee Harvey Oswald. The second card served the purpose of adding the name Marina Oswald Porter to the "Watch List" on 29 June 1965 after she remarried. Both names were deleted from the list as of 26 May 1972.

Thus, the statements of former CIA employees were corroborated by the Agency's response regarding the explanation of the index cards in the CIA's HT-Lingual files pertaining to Oswald. The explanations attested to the fact that the references on the cards were not demonstrative of an Agency relationship with Oswald, but instead were examples of notations routinely utilized in connection with the HT-Lingual project.

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4. Did the CIA ever debrief Lee Harvey Oswald?

The CIA has denied ever having had any contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, and its records are consistent with this position. Because the Agency has a Domestic Contacts Division which routinely attempts to solicit information on a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad, the absence of any record indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald, a returning defector who had worked in a Minsk radio factory, had not been debriefed has been considered by Warren Commission critics to be either inherently noncredible (i.e., the record has been destroyed) or indicative that Oswald had been contacted through other than routine Domestic Contact Division channels.

After reviewing the Agency's records pertaining to this issue, the Committee's initial point of inquiry was to interview

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the former chief of an Agency component responsible for research related to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union who had written a November 25, 1963 memorandum which indicated that, upon Oswald's return from the Soviet Union,\* this officer had considered "the laying of interviews [on him] through [the Domestic Contacts Division] or other suitable channels." This individual indicated that Oswald was considered suspect because the Soviets had appeared to have been very solicitous of him. For this reason, a nonclandestine contact, either by the Domestic Contacts Division or other "suitable channels" such as the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

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\*The memorandum indicates that the possibility of an Oswald contact was discussed during the summer of 1960, but the author indicated that the conversation actually took place during the summer of 1962, shortly before his transfer to a new assignment. During the summer of 1960, the author was not on an active assignment.

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was considered. The officer stated, however, that to his knowledge, no contact with Oswald was ever made; moreover, if a debriefing had occurred, the officer stated that he would have been informed. Finally, he stated that Oswald was considered a potential lead, but only of marginal importance, and therefore the absence of a debriefing was not at all unusual.

The Committee interviewed five other Agency employees who were in a position to have discussed Oswald in 1962 with the author of this memorandum, including the person who replaced the author of the memorandum as chief of the research section, but none of them could recall any such conversation. Interviews with personnel from the Soviet Russia Division's clandestine operations section, the American legal travelers program, and the clandestine activity research section failed

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to result in any evidence suggesting that Oswald had been  
contacted at any time by the CIA.

The author of the November 25, 1963 memorandum also  
informed the Committee that the CIA maintained a large  
volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in which  
Oswald worked. This information was stored in the Office of  
Research and Reporting. \_\_\_/ Another former CIA employee, who  
had worked in the Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet  
branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962, advised the  
Committee that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence  
regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In fact, this individual  
claims that during the summer of 1962 he reviewed a contact  
report from representatives of the CIA's New York field office  
who had interviewed a former Marine who had worked at the Minsk  
Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This defector,

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whom the employee believes may have been Oswald, had been  
living with his family in Minsk.

The employee advised the Committee that the contact  
report was filed in a volume concerning the Minsk Radio Plant  
which should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch,  
then a component of the Office of Central Reference. Accordingly,  
the Committee requested that the CIA provide both the above-  
described contact report and the volume of materials  
concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. A review by the Committee  
of the documents in the volumes on the Minsk Radio Plant,  
however, revealed that no such contact report existed in  
that file.

The CIA has stated to the Committee that between 1958  
and 1963 it had no procedure for the systematic debriefing of  
overseas travelers, including returning defectors. Instead,

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the Agency relied upon the FBI both to make such contacts and  
report any significant results.

To investigate this question further, the Committee  
reviewed the files of 22 individuals (selected from an original  
list of 380 possible Soviet defectors) who were born in America  
and appeared to have returned to the United States between  
1958 and 1963.\* Of these 22 individuals, only four were  
interviewed at any time by the CIA. These four instances  
tended to involve particular intelligence or counterintelligence  
needs, but this was not always the case.

Based upon this file review, it appears that, in fact,  
the CIA did not contact returning defectors in 1962 as a matter

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\*An effort was also made to review only the files of American-  
born individuals who had defected during these years. Not  
all of the 22 individuals, however, met this criteria.

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of standard operating procedure. For this reason, the  
absence of any Agency contact with Oswald upon his return from  
the Soviet Union cannot be considered in any way unusual,  
particularly since the FBI did fulfill its jurisdictional  
obligation to conduct such interviews.

5. The Justice Department's Failure to Prosecute Lee Harvey  
Oswald for Offering to Give Intelligence Information to  
the Soviet Union

When Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the United States  
Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959 for the purpose of  
renouncing his American citizenship, he allegedly offered to  
give the Soviets information that he had acquired as a  
Marine Corps radar operator. \_\_\_/ The Committee sought  
to determine why the Justice Department did not prosecute  
Oswald for his offer to divulge this kind of information.

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A review of Oswald's correspondence with the American  
embassy in Moscow indicates that on February 13, 1961 the  
embassy received a letter from him in which he expressed a  
"desire to return to the United States if...some agreement  
/could be reached/ concerning the dropping of any legal  
proceedings against /him/." \_\_\_/ On February 28, 1961, the  
embassy sought guidance from the State Department concerning  
Oswald's potential liability to criminal prosecution. \_\_\_/  
The State Department, however, responded on April 13, 1961 that  
it was "not in a position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his  
desired return to the United States he may be amenable to  
prosecution for any possible offenses committed in violation  
of the laws of the United States..." \_\_\_/

On May 10, 1961, Oswald wrote the embassy demanding a  
"full guarantee" against the possibility of prosecution. \_\_\_/

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He visited with embassy consul Richard Snyder on July 16, 1961, and denied that he had ever given any information to the Soviets. \_\_\_/ Snyder advised Oswald on an informal basis that, while no assurances could be given, the embassy did not perceive any basis for prosecuting Oswald for an offense involving any severe punishment. \_\_\_/

There is no record that the State Department ever gave Oswald any assurances that he would not be prosecuted. Upon his return to the United States, Oswald was interviewed twice by the FBI. On each occasion, he denied ever giving any information to the Soviet Union. \_\_\_/

In a response to a Committee request, the Department of Justice indicated that prosecution of Oswald was never considered because his file contains no evidence that he had ever revealed or offered to reveal national defense information

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to the Soviet Union. \_\_\_\_/. In a subsequent response, the  
Department acknowledged the existence of some evidence that  
Oswald had offered information to the Soviet Union, but  
stated that there were, nevertheless, serious obstacles to a  
possible prosecution:

It (Department file) does contain a copy of  
an FBI memorandum, dated July 3, 1961, which  
is recorded as having been received in the  
Justice Department's Internal Security  
Division on December 10, 1963, which states  
that the files of the Office of Naval  
Intelligence contained a copy of a Department  
of State telegram, dated October 31, 1959,  
at Moscow. The telegram, which is summarized  
in the FBI report, quoted Oswald as having  
offered the Soviets any information he had  
acquired as a radar operator. The FBI report  
did not indicate that the information to  
which Oswald had access as a radar operator  
was classified.

Oswald returned to the United States on  
June 13, 1962. He was interviewed by the  
FBI on June 26, 1962, at Fort Worth,  
Texas, at which time he denied furnishing  
any information to the Soviets concerning  
his Marine Corps experiences. He stated  
that he never gave the Soviets any information  
which would be used to the detriment of the  
United States.

In sum, therefore, the only "evidence"  
that Oswald ever offered to furnish  
information to the Soviets is his own  
reported statement to an official at the

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U.S. embassy in Moscow. That statement, of course, was contradicted by his denial to the FBI, upon his return to the United States, that he had ever made such an offer.

In the prosecution of a criminal case, the Government cannot establish a prima facie case solely on a defendant's unsupported confession. The Government must introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the defendant's statement. See, Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954).

Accordingly, in the absence of any information that Oswald had offered to reveal classified information to the Soviets, and lacking corroboration of his statement that he had proffered information of any kind to the Russians, we did not consider his prosecution for violation of the espionage statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 793. \_\_\_/

Based upon this analysis, there is no evidence that Oswald received favorable treatment from either the State Department or the Justice Department regarding the possibility of a criminal prosecution.

6. Oswald's Contacts with Americans in the Soviet Union

a) Priscilla Johnson McMillan

Priscilla Johnson McMillan, author of Marina and Lee, became a subject of the Committee's inquiry because she was

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one of two American correspondents who had obtained an interview with Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in Moscow in 1959. The Committee sought to investigate the allegation that Ms. McMillan's interview with Oswald had been arranged by the CIA.

John McVickar, a consul at the American embassy, testified that he had Oswald's case with Ms. McMillan, and that he thought "she might help us in communicating with him and help him in dealing with what appeared to be a very strong personal problem if she were able to talk with him." \_\_/

McVickar stated, however, that he had never worked in any capacity for the CIA, nor did he believe that Ms. McMillan had any such affiliation. The Committee's review of Mr. McVickar's State Department and CIA files confirmed that he had never been associated with the CIA.

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According to Ms. McMillan's testimony about the events surrounding her interview with Lee Harvey Oswald, in November 1959 she had just returned from a visit to the United States where she covered the Camp David summit between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. On November 16, 1959, she went to the American embassy to pick up her mail for the first time since her return to the Soviet Union. The mail pickup facility was in a foyer near the consular office. Consular Officer John A. McVickar came out of this office and welcomed McMillan back to the Soviet Union. They exchanged a few words, and as she was leaving, McVickar commented that at her hotel was an American who was trying to defect to the Soviet Union. McVickar stated that the American would not speak to "any of us," but might speak to McMillan because she was a woman. She recalls that as she was leaving, McVickar

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told her to remember that she was an American.

McMillan proceeded to her hotel, found out the American's room number, knocked on his door, and asked him for an interview. The American, Lee Harvey Oswald, did not ask her into the room, but he did agree to talk to her in her room later that night. No American government official arranged the actual interview with Oswald. She met with Oswald just once. She believes that McVickar called her on November 17, the day after her interview with Oswald, and asked her to supper. That evening at supper they discussed her interview with Oswald. McVickar indicated a general concern about Oswald and felt that the attitude of another American consular official might have pushed Oswald further in the direction of defection. McVickar indicated a personal feeling that it would be a sad thing for Oswald to defect in view of his age, but he did not indicate

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that this was the U.S. Government's position (p.18).

Ms. Millan also testified that she had never worked for the CIA, nor was she connected with any other federal government agency at the time of her interview with Lee Harvey Oswald.

According to an affidavit that Ms. McMillan filed with the Committee, her only employment with the federal government was as a 30-day temporary translator for the Joint Press Reading Service, an organization that was operated by the American, British, and Canadian embassies in Moscow.

Finally, Ms. McMillan testified that because of her background in Russian studies, she applied for a position with the CIA in 1952 as an intelligence analyst. The application was withdrawn, but the CIA completed its security check on her and denied her a security clearance. She acknowledged being debriefed by an Agency employee in 1962 after returning

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from her third trip to the Soviet Union, but explained that this contact was in some way related to the confiscation of her notes by Soviet officials.\*

The Committee's review of CIA files pertaining to Ms. McMillan corroborated her testimony. There was no indication in the file suggesting that she had ever worked for

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\*In November 1962, I had a conversation with a man who identified himself as a C.I.A. employee and gave his name as either Donald Jameson or James MacDonald. I agreed to see him in part because the confiscation of my papers and notes had utterly altered my situation -- I now had no hope of returning to the U.S.S.R. and was free for the first time to write what I knew. I was preparing a series of articles for The Reporter which would contain the same information about which Mr. Jameson had expressed a desire to talk to me. Finally, during the latter part of my 1962 trip to the U.S.S.R., I had been under heavy surveillance and the K.G.B. knew what Soviet citizens I had seen. Many of those I had talked to for the Reporter articles were Russian "liberals" (anti-Stalin and pro-Khrushchev). What reprisals might befall those whom I had interviewed I did not know, but since my notes were now part of the K.G.B. files, I felt that it might help them if the C.I.A. knew that which the K.G.B. already knew. My meeting with Mr. Jameson, which occurred at the Brattle Inn, Cambridge, was a reversal of my usual effort to avoid contact with the C.I.A., and the subject matter was confined to my impressions of the Soviet literary and cultural climate.

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the CIA. In fact, there was some evidence suggesting that the Agency was reluctant even to debrief her after her trips to the Soviet Union. An interview with the former Agency official who had been deputy chief and then chief of the American legal travelers program during the years 1958 to 1961 confirmed that Ms. McMillan had not been used by the CIA in that program.

There was information in Ms. McMillan's file indicating that on occasion during the years 1962-65 she had provided cultural and literary type information to the CIA. None of this information, however, was suggestive in any way of a clandestine relationship. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Ms. McMillan ever worked for the CIA or received the Agency's assistance in obtaining an interview with Lee Harvey

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Oswald.\*

b) Richard E. Snyder

Richard E. Snyder was the consular official in the United States Moscow embassy who handled the Oswald case. It was Snyder with whom Oswald met in 1959 when Oswald sought to renounce his American citizenship. Two years later, when Oswald initiated his inquiries about returning to the United States, Snyder again became involved in the case. Warren Commission critics have alleged that Snyder was associated in some way with the CIA during his service in the Moscow embassy.


In his Committee deposition, Richard Snyder acknowledged that for an eleven-month period during 1949-50 he worked for

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\*Nor is there any basis, based upon Ms. McMillan's testimony, CIA files, and an affidavit provided by McMillan's publisher, Harper and Row, to support the allegation that the CIA financed the book Marina and Lee.

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the CIA while he was on the waiting list for a foreign service appointment with the State Department. Snyder testified, however, that, since resigning from the CIA in March of 1950, he has had no contact with the CIA other than a letter written in 1970 or 1971 inquiring about employment on a contractual basis.\*

The Committee reviewed Snyder's files at the State Department, Defense Department, and the CIA. Both the State Department and Defense Department are consistent with his testimony. Snyder's CIA file revealed that at one time prior to 1974 it had been red flagged and maintained on a segregated basis. The file contained a routing indicator which stated that the file had been red flagged because of a

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\*Snyder also denied contact with any other intelligence service while active as a foreign service officer.

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"DCI statement and a matter of cover" concerning Snyder.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA indicated that the DCI statement presumably refers to comments which former DCI Richard Helms had made in 1964 concerning the Oswald case when Helms had been Deputy Director for Plans.\* The CIA also stated that Snyder's file had been flagged at the request of DDO/CI to ensure that all inquiries concerning Snyder would be referred to that office. The Agency was unable to explain the reference to "cover" because according to its records Snyder had never been assigned any cover while employed. Further, the Agency stated that "there is no record in Mr. Snyder's Official Personnel File that he ever worked, directly

\*Responding to a newspaper allegation that Oswald had met with CIA representatives in Moscow, Richard Helms wrote a memorandum to the Warren Commission on March 18, 1964 in which he stated the "desire to state for the record that the allegation carried in this press report is utterly unfounded as far as the CIA is concerned."

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or indirectly, in any capacity for the CIA after his  
resignation on 26 September 1950."

The Committee does not regard this explanation as  
satisfactory, especially since Snyder's 201 file indicates that  
for approximately one year during 1956-1957 he was used by an  
Agency case officer as a spotter at Harvard University because  
of his access to other students who might be going to the  
Soviet Union, nor was the Agency actually able to explain  
specifically why someone considered it necessary to red  
flag the Snyder file.

The remainder of the Snyder file, however, is entirely  
consistent with his testimony before the Committee concerning  
the absence of Agency contacts. In addition, the CIA  
personnel officer who handled Snyder's case in 1950 confirmed  
that Snyder had, in fact, terminated his employment with the

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CIA at that time. Moreover, he added that Snyder did not go  
to the State Department under any kind of cover arrangement. \_\_/

This position was confirmed by a former State Department  
official who was aware of procedures for State Department  
cover for CIA employees. In addition, this individual stated  
that at no time from 1959 to 1963 did the CIA use the State  
Department's overseas consular positions as cover for CIA  
intelligence officers.

(Insertion to follow -- Analysis)

c) Dr. Alexis H. Davison

Dr. Alexis H. Davison was the U.S. Embassy physician in  
Moscow from May 1961 to May 1963. In May 1963 he was expelled  
from the Soviet Union in connection with the Penkovsky spy  
case. After the assassination of President Kennedy, it was

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discovered that the name of Dr. Davison's mother, Mrs. Hal Davison, and her Atlanta address were in Oswald's address book under the heading "mother of U.S. Embassy doctor." In addition, it was also determined that the flight which Oswald, his wife and child took from New York to Dallas on June 14, 1962 had stopped in Atlanta.

For this reason, it has been alleged that Dr. Davison was Oswald's intelligence contact in Moscow.

In a Committee interview, Dr. Alexis Davison stated that he had been a physician in the U.S. Air Force and was stationed in Moscow as the U.S. Embassy physician from May 1961 to May 1963. In this capacity, it was his duty to perform physical examinations on all Soviet immigrants to the United States. He recalls that most of these immigrants were elderly, but he remembers two young women, one who was a mathematics

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teacher from the south of Russia and one who was married to an American. The latter was very frightened by the prospect of going to the United States. She stated that she was going to Texas with her husband. Davison said that if she and her husband traveled through Atlanta on their way to Texas, his mother, a native-born Russian, would be happy to see her. He gave his mother's name and address in Atlanta to the woman's husband, who was "scruffy looking." This was not an unusual thing to do, since his family had always been very hospitable to Russians who visited Atlanta. In retrospect, he assumes that he gave his mother's name and address to either Lee or Marina Oswald, but he is uncertain in this regard. \_\_/

After the assassination of President Kennedy, Davison was interviewed first by a Secret Service agent and later by an FBI agent in connection with the entry of his mother's

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name and address in Oswald's address book. The FBI agent also interviewed Davison's mother, Mrs. Hal (Natalia Alekseevna) Davison. Davison indicated that the Secret Service and the FBI were the only government agencies to interview him about his contact with the Oswalds. \_\_/

Davison admitted his involvement in the Penkovsky spy case. Specifically, he stated that in connection with his assignment as U.S. Embassy physician in Moscow, he had received some superficial intelligence training. This training mainly involved lectures on Soviet life and instructions on remembering and reporting Soviet names and military activities. During his tour of duty in Moscow, Davison was asked by an Embassy employee, whose name he no longer remembers, to observe a certain lamp post on his daily route between his apartment and the Embassy and to be alert for a signal by telephone;

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Davison agreed.

(According to his instructions, if he ever saw a black chalk mark on the lamp post or if he ever received a telephone call in which the caller blew into the receiver three times, he was to notify a person whose name he no longer remembers.) He was told nothing else about this operation. Davison performed his role in this operation for approximately one year. He participated in no other operations during his tour of duty in Moscow, but he did perform some desk work for the Air Attache. On just one occasion, toward the end of this year, he observed the mark on the lamp post and his wife received the telephone signal. As instructed, he reported these happenings. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets reported that they had broken the Penkovsky spying operation. The Soviets declared Davison persona non grata just after he left Moscow because his tour of duty had ended. He does not

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recall any intelligence debriefings on the Penkovsky  
case. \_\_/

Davison denied participating in any other intelligence  
activity related work during his employment in Moscow, and  
provided the Committee with an affidavit to this effect.

The former deputy chief of the CIA's Soviet Russia clandestine  
activities section during 1960-62 confirmed Davison's position,  
and characterized his involvement in the Penkovsky case as a  
"one shot" deal. In addition, a review of Davison's CIA and  
Department of Defense files was also entirely consistent with  
his Committee testimony.

Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that Dr.  
Davison was Lee Harvey Oswald's intelligence contact in  
Moscow.

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7. George deMohrenschildt

George deMohrenschildt was a prominent member of Dallas' White Russian" community who befriended Lee Harvey Oswald. This friendship has engendered considerable speculation because of the contrast between the backgrounds of the two men. DeMohrenschildt was described as sophisticated and well educated, one who moved easily in the social and professional circles of oilmen and the so-called "White Russian" community, many of whom were avowed right-wingers. Oswald's "lowly" background did not include much education or influence, and he was, in fact, shunned by the very same Dallas Russian community which embraced deMohrenschildt. DeMohrenschildt committed suicide in 1977 shortly after having been contacted for an interview by a Committee investigator.

In his Warren Commission testimony, deMohrenschildt

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stated that he believed he had discussed Lee Harvey Oswald  
with J. Walton Moore, whom deMohrenschildt described as "a  
Government man -- either FBI or Central Intelligence." \_\_/  
DeMohrenschildt said Moore had interviewed him when he  
returned from Yugoslavia and that he was known as the head of  
the FBI in Dallas. \_\_/ DeMohrenschildt said that he had  
asked Moore and Ft. Worth attorney Max Clark about Oswald to  
reassure himself that it was "safe" for the deMohrenschildts  
to assist Oswald, \_\_/ and was told by one of these persons  
that "the guy seems to be OK." \_\_/ This admitted association  
with J. Walton Moore, a known employee of the CIA's  
Domestic Contacts Division, gave rise to the question of  
whether deMohrenschildt had contacted Lee Harvey Oswald on  
behalf of the CIA.

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In 1963 J. Walton Moore was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency in Dallas, Texas in the Domestic Contacts Division. According to Moore's CIA personnel file, he was assigned to the Domestic Contacts Division in 1948. In a fitness report for the period April 1, 1963 through March 31, 1964, Moore's duties in the Dallas office included "supervising and managing a resident agency; exploitation of source's complete intelligence potential by debriefing...; writing reports; keeps informed on foreign situations and intelligence requirements in order to better orient and exploit sources; and searches for and develops new sources."

In an Agency memorandum dated April 13, 1977 contained in George deMohrenschildt's CIA file, Moore set forth facts to counter a claim which had been recently made by WFAA-TV in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald had been employed by the

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CIA and that Moore had known Oswald. In that memorandum, Moore is quoted as saying that according to his records the last time he had talked with George deMohrenschildt was in the fall of 1961. Moore said that he had no recollection of any conversation with deMohrenschildt concerning Lee Harvey Oswald. The memorandum also says that Moore recalls only two occasions when he met deMohrenschildt -- first, in the spring of 1958 to discuss the mutual interest the two couples had in mainland China; and then in the fall of 1961 when the deMohrenschildts showed films of their Latin American walking trip.

Other documents in deMohrenschildt's CIA file, however, indicate more contact between Moore and deMohrenschildt than was stated in the 1977 memorandum by Moore. In a memorandum dated May 1, 1964 from Moore to the Acting Chief of the Contacts

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Division of the CIA, Moore stated that he had known George deMohrenschildt and his wife since 1957, at which time Moore got biographical data on deMohrenschildt after a trip to Yugoslavia for the International Cooperation Administration. Moore says also in that 1964 memorandum that he had seen deMohrenschildt several times in 1958 and 1959. DeMohrenschildt's CIA file contains several reports submitted by deMohrenschildt to the CIA on topics concerning Yugoslavia, including "Lack of Interest in Communist Ideology," "National Pride/Feeling of Superiority over Soviet Satellites," and "Effect of Decentralization in the Oil Industry."

DeMohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that he had never been in any respect an intelligence agent. \_\_\_/ The Committee interview with Moore and its review of the CIA's Moore and deMohrenschildt files confirmed that deMohrenschildt

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had never been an American intelligence agent. In this regard, it should be stressed that, upon returning from trips abroad, \_\_\_\_\_ of Americans annually provide information to the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division on a nonclandestine basis. Such acts of cooperation should not be confused with an actual Agency relationship.\*


8. William G. Gaudet

William G. Gaudet was a newspaper editor who was issued the Mexican tourist card immediately preceding Lee Harvey Oswald's on September 17, 1963. Two days later, he departed for a three- or four-week trip to Mexico and other Latin

\*DeMohrenschildt's file also makes reference to an occasion where he may have been involved in arranging a meeting between a Haitian bank officer and a CIA or Department of Defense official. A Department of Defense official interviewed by the Committee stated that the meeting was arranged by Department of Defense officials and that deMohrenschildt's presence (in the company of his wife) was unanticipated. The Committee does not regard this incident as evidence of any Agency relationship because there is no indication that any United States governmental official actually solicited deMohrenschildt's assistance with regard to this meeting.

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American countries. This happened to coincide with Oswald's visit to Mexico City between September 27, 1963 and October , 1963. After the assassination, Gaudet advised the FBI during an interview that he had once been employed by the CIA. Speculation about Gaudet's possible relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald was created when it was discovered that the Warren Commission Report contained a list, provided by the Mexican Government and purporting to include all individuals who had been issued Mexican tourist cards at the same time as Oswald, which nevertheless omitted Gaudet's name. \_\_/

At a Committee deposition, Gaudet testified that his contact with the CIA was primarily as a source of information reflecting information that he had obtained during his trips abroad; in addition, Gaudet maintained that he occasionally performed errands for Agency personnel. Gaudet stated that his

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last contact with the CIA was in 1969, but that the relationship  
had never been formally terminated.

The Committee reviewed Gaudet's CIA file, but found  
neither any record reflecting a contact between him and the  
Agency after 1961 nor any indication that he had "performed  
errands" for the CIA.\* A memorandum, dated January 23, 1976,  
seemed to confirm the absence of any further contact after  
this time:

The Domestic Collections Division (DCD) has an inactive  
file on William George Gaudet, former editor and  
publisher of The Latin American Report. The file shows  
that Gaudet was a source of the New Orleans DCD  
Resident Office from 1948 to 1955 during which period  
he provided foreign intelligence information on Latin  
American political and economic conditions resulting  
from his extensive travel in South and Central America  
in pursuit of journalistic interests. The file further  
indicates that Gaudet was a casual contact of the New  
Orleans Office between 1955 and 1961 when, at various  
times, he furnished fragmentary intelligence and tried  
unsuccessfully to obtain financial loans from the Agency,

\*The file did contain a routing indication, which the Agency  
has failed to explain, to the effect that someone "agrees with  
the manner in which this case is being handled." \_\_\_\_/

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through DCD, to support his publication. There is  
no correspondence in the DCD file on Gaudet after 1961.

Gaudet could not recall whether his trip to Mexico and  
other Latin American countries in 1963 involved any intelligence  
related activity. He was able to testify, however, that he  
did not encounter Lee Harvey Oswald, whom he had previously  
seen on occasion at the New Orleans Trade Mart, during that trip.  
Gaudet was unaware that his Mexican tourist card had been  
issued immediately before Oswald's and could not recall having  
seen Oswald on that day. Finally, Gaudet did not have any  
information concerning the omission of his name from the  
list published in the Warren Commission Report.

Based upon this evidence, the Committee does not find  
a basis for concluding that Gaudet may have contacted Lee  
Harvey Oswald on behalf of the CIA. Although there is a  
conflict between Gaudet's testimony and his CIA file concerning

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the duration of his Agency contacts as well as the performance of errands, there is no indication from his file or testimony that Gaudet's cooperation involved clandestine activity. Again, it should be stressed that the Domestic Contacts Division, which was the Agency component that was in touch with Gaudet, was not involved in clandestine operations.

9. Oswald's Trip to Helsinki and the Issuance of His Entry

Visa into the Soviet Union

Oswald's trip from London to Helsinki has been a point of controversy because his passport indicates that he arrived in Finland on October 10, 1959 and the Tornio Hotel in Helsinki had him registered as a guest on that date, but the only direct flight from London to Helsinki landed at 11:33 p.m.; according to a memorandum signed in 1964 by

Richard Helms, "If Oswald had taken this flight, he could

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not normally have cleared customs and landing formalities and reached the Torni Hotel downtown by 2400 (midnight) on the same day." \_\_\_/ Further questions concerning this segment of Oswald's trip have been raised by his ability to obtain a Soviet entry visa within only two days of having applied for it on October 12, 1959.\*

The Committee was unable to determine the circumstances surrounding Oswald's trip from London to Helsinki. Louis Hopkins, the travel agent who arranged Oswald's initial transportation from the United States, stated that he did not know Oswald's ultimate destination at the time that Oswald booked his passage on the freighter Marion Lykes; consequently, Hopkins had nothing to do with the London to Helsinki leg of

\_\_\_\_\_  
\*Since Oswald arrived in Helsinki on October 10, 1959, which was a Saturday, it is assumed that his first opportunity to apply for a visa was on Monday, the twelfth.

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Oswald's trip. In fact, Hopkins stated that had he known  
Oswald's final destination, he would have suggested sailing on  
another ship that would have docked at a port more convenient  
to Russia.

Hopkins indicated that Oswald did not appear to be  
particularly well informed about travel to Europe. The  
travel agent did not know whether Oswald had been referred to  
him by anyone.

A request for any files that the CIA and Department of  
Defense may have pertaining to Lewis Hopkins resulted in a  
negative name trace. The Committee was unable to obtain any  
additional sources of information regarding Oswald's London  
to Helsinki trip.

In contrast, the relative ease with which Oswald  
obtained his Soviet Union entry visa was more readily  
amenable to investigation. This issue is one that was also

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of concern to the Warren Commission. \_\_\_/ In a letter to  
the CIA dated May 25, 1964, J. Lee Rankin inquired about the  
apparent speed with which Oswald's Soviet visa was issued.  
Rankin noted that he had recently spoken with Abraham Chayes  
of the State Department who contended that at the time  
Oswald received his visa to enter Russia from the Soviet  
Embassy in Helsinki, at least one week ordinarily passed  
between the time of a tourist's application for a visa and  
the issuance of the visa. Rankin contended that if Chayes'  
assessment was accurate, then Oswald's ability to obtain  
his tourist visa in two days might have been very significant.

The CIA responded to Rankin's request for information  
on July 31, 1964. Richard Helms wrote to Rankin that the Soviet  
Consulate in Helsinki was able to issue a transit visa (valid  
for 24 hours) to U.S. businessmen within five minutes, but

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if a longer stay were intended at least one week was needed to process a visa application and arrange lodging through Soviet Intourist. A second communication from Helms to Rankin, dated September 14, 1964, added that during the 1964 tourist season, Soviet Consulates in at least some Western European cities issued Soviet tourist visas in from five to seven days.

In an effort to resolve this issue, the Committee has reviewed the CIA file on Gregory Golub, who was the Soviet Consul in Helsinki when Oswald was issued his tourist visa. Golub's file reveals that, in addition to his Consular activities, he was suspected to have been an officer of the Soviet KGB.

Two CIA dispatches from Helsinki concerning Golub are of particular significance with regard to the time

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necessary for issuance of visas to Americans for travel into  
the Soviet Union. The first dispatch records that Golub  
disclosed during a luncheon conversation that:

Moscow had given him the authority to give  
Americans visas without prior approval from  
Moscow. He (Golub) stated that this would  
make his job much easier, and as long as  
he was convinced the American was "all right"  
he could give him a visa in a matter of  
minutes... (emphasis added)

The second CIA dispatch, dated October 9, 1959, one  
day prior to Oswald's arrival in Helsinki, illustrates that  
Golub did have the authority to issue visas without delay.  
The dispatch discusses a telephone contact between Golub  
and his consular counterpart at the American Embassy in  
Helsinki:

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...Since that evening (September 4, 1959) Golub has only phoned (the US consul) once and this was on a business matter. Two Americans were in the Soviet Consulate at the time and were applying for Soviet visas thru (sic) Golub. They had previously been in the American consulate inquiring about the possibility of obtaining a Soviet visa in one or two days. (The U.S. Consul) advised them to go directly to Golub and make their request, which they did. Golub phoned (the U.S. Consul) to state that he would give them their visas as soon as they made advance Intourist reservations. When they did this, Golub immediately gave them their visas...\* (emphasis added)

Thus, based upon these two factors: (1) Golub's authority to issue visas to Americans without prior approval from Moscow, and (2) a demonstration of this authority, as reported in a CIA dispatch approximately one month prior to Oswald's appearance at the Soviet Embassy, the Committee has found that the available evidence tends to support the conclusion that issuance of Oswald's tourist visa within

\*Evidently, Oswald had made arrangements with Intourist because upon his arrival at the Moscow railroad station on October 16, he was met by an Intourist representative and taken to the Hotel Berlin where he registered as a student. \_/

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two days after his appearance at the Soviet Consulate was not necessarily unusual.

10. The Oswald Photograph in the Office of Naval

Intelligence Files

The Office of Naval Intelligence's Lee Harvey Oswald file contained a photograph of Oswald, taken at the approximate time of his Marine Corps induction, that was contained in an envelope which had on it the language "REC'D 14 November 1963" and "CIA 77978." These markings raised the possibility that Oswald had been in some way associated with the CIA.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the Department of Defense stated that the photograph had been obtained by ONI as a result of a CIA request for two copies of the most recent photographs of Oswald so that an attempt could be made

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to verify his reported presence in Mexico City. The requested copies, however, were not made available to the CIA until after the President's assassination. Because of the absence of documentation, no explanation was given for how or when the Office of Naval Intelligence received this particular photograph of Oswald.

The Committee's review of CIA cable traffic confirmed that cable number 77978, dated October 24, 1963, was in fact a request for two copies of the Department of the Navy's most recent photograph of Lee Henry (sic) Oswald. Moreover, review of other cable traffic corroborated the Agency's desire to determine whether Lee Harvey Oswald had, in fact, been in Mexico City.

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11. Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City

The Committee also considered whether Oswald's activities and possible associations in Mexico City were indicative of a relationship between him and the CIA. This aspect of the Committee's investigation involved a complete review both of alleged Oswald associates and of various CIA operations outside of the United States.

The Committee found no evidence suggestive of any relationship between Oswald and the CIA. Moreover, the Agency's investigative efforts, prior to the assassination, regarding Oswald's presence in Mexico City served to confirm the absence of any relationship with him. Specifically, when apprised of his possible presence in Mexico City, the Agency both initiated internal inquiries concerning his background and, once informed of his Soviet experience, notified other

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potentially interested federal agencies of his possible contact with the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. Finally, the overt nature and frequency of Oswald's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Consulates (i.e., a total of at least five visits) also tended to indicate that Oswald was not under the direction of any professional intelligence officers.


12. Lee Harvey Oswald's Military Records

The Committee reviewed Oswald's military records because of allegations that he had received intelligence training and had participated in intelligence operations during his term of service. Particular attention was given to the charges that Oswald's early discharge from the Marine Corps was designed to serve as a cover for an intelligence assignment and that his records reflected neither his true security clearance nor a substantial period of service in

Taiwan. These allegations were considered relevant to the

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question of whether Oswald had been performing intelligence assignments for military intelligence as well as to the issue of Oswald's possible association with the CIA.

Oswald's Marine Corps records bore no indication that he had ever received any intelligence training or performed on any intelligence assignments during his term of service. As a Marine serving in Atsugi, Japan, Oswald had a security clearance of confidential and never received a higher classification. Based upon the Warren Commission testimony of John E. Donovan, the officer who had been in charge of Oswald's crew, that all personnel working in the radar center were required to have a minimum security clearance of secret, the allegation has been made that the security clearance of confidential in Oswald's records is inaccurate. This allegation, however, was refuted by a review of files belonging

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to four enlisted men who had worked with Oswald; each of them  
had a security clearance of confidential.\*

Oswald's military records also dispelled the allegation  
that he had served for a substantial period in Taiwan. These  
records state that Oswald served in Japan from September 12,  
1957 until November 2, 1958. Department of Defense records,  
however, do indicate that MAG (Marine Air Group) 11, Oswald's unit  
was deployed for Taiwan on September 16, 1958 and remained in  
that area until April 1959, but an examination of the MAG 11  
unit diaries indicated that Oswald had remained in Japan as  
part of a rear echelon. Oswald's records also state that on  
October 6, 1958 he was transferred within MAG 11 to a  
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron subunit in Atsugi,  
Japan. The next week he reportedly spent in the Atsugi  
\*John E. Donovan, Oswald's immediate commanding officer, did  
have a security clearance of secret.

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Station Hospital. On November 2, 1958, Oswald left Japan  
for duty in the United States.

Accordingly, there is no indication in Oswald's  
military records that he had spent any time in Taiwan. This  
finding is contrary to that of the Warren Commission that  
Oswald arrived with his unit in Taiwan on September 30, 1958, \_\_/  
but the Commission's analysis apparently was made without access  
to the unit diaries of MAG 11.\*

Finally, with one exception, the circumstances surrounding  
Oswald's rapid discharge from the military do not appear to have  
been unusual. Oswald was obligated to service on active duty  
until December 7, 1959, but he applied for a hardship discharge  
on August 17, 1958 and two weeks later the application

\*Similarly, a message sent on November 4, 1959 from the Chief  
of Naval Operations concerning Oswald, which states that he  
had "served with Marine Air Control Squadrons in Japan and  
Taiwan" may have been issued without checking unit diaries  
which indicated that Oswald had not been so deployed.

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was approved.\* It appears, however, that Oswald's application was processed so expeditiously because it was accompanied with all of the necessary documentation.

In response to a Committee inquiry, the Department of Defense has stated that "to a large extent, the time involved in processing depended on how well the individual member had prepared the documentation needed for consideration of his or her case." \_\_\_/ A review of Oswald's case indicates that his initial application was accompanied by all of the requisite documentation. Oswald had met the preliminary requirements of having made a voluntary contribution to the hardship dependent and of applying for a dependent's quarters

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\*By September 4, 1959, Oswald had been informed that he would be discharged on September 11, 1959. This explains why he was able to tell passport officials on that day that he expected to depart the United States on September 21, 1959.

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allotment to alleviate the hardship. His application indicated that these measures had been taken, and was accompanied by two letters and two affidavits attesting to Marguerite Oswald's inability to support herself.

Documents provided to the Committee by the American Red Cross indicate that he sought their assistance regarding this matter, and therefore was probably well advised on the requisite documentation to support his claim. Indeed, Red Cross officials interviewed Marguerite Oswald, and concluded that she "could not be considered employable from an emotional standpoint." \_/

The Fort Worth Red Cross Office indicated a quarters allotment was necessary for Marguerite Oswald, rather than a hardship discharge for Lee, and assisted her in the preparation of the necessary application documents.

Oswald nevertheless informed the Red Cross office in

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El Toro, California, where he was then stationed, that he desired to apply for a hardship discharge. The unusual aspect of Oswald's discharge application was that technically his requisite application for a quarters allowance for his mother should have been disallowed because Marguerite's dependency affidavit stated that Oswald had not contributed any money to her during the preceding year. \_\_\_/

Nevertheless, the first officer to review Oswald's application noted in his endoresment, dated August 19, 1959, that "[a] genuine hardship exists in this case, and in my opinion approval of the [quarters] allotment will not sufficiently alleviate this situation."\*\_\_\_/ In addition, five other officers endorsed Oswald's application. The

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\*This quotation suggests the possibility that applications for quarters allotments and hardship discharges are considered independently of one another.

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Committee was able to contact three of the six endorsing officers; two had no memory of the event, \_\_/ and one could not recall any details. \_\_/ The Committee considers their absence of memory to be indicative of the Oswald case having been handled in a routine manner.

Based upon this evidence, the Committee was not able to discern any unusual discrepancies or features in Oswald's military record.

13. Lee Harvey Oswald's Military Intelligence File

On November 22, 1963, soon after the assassination, Lt. Col. Robert E. Jones, Operations Officer of the U.S. Army's 112th Military Intelligence Group (MIG), Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, contacted the FBI offices in San Antonio and Dallas and gave those offices detailed information concerning Oswald and A.J. Hidell, his alleged alias. This information

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suggested the existence of a Military Intelligence file on Oswald, and raised the possibility that he had intelligence associations of some kind. The Committee's investigation, however, revealed that military intelligence officials had opened a file on Oswald because he was perceived as a possible counterintelligence threat.

Robert E. Jones testified before the Committee that in June of 1963 he had been serving as Operations Officer of the 112th Military Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.\* Under the Group's control were seven regions encompassing five states: Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Jones was directly responsible for counterintelligence operations background investigations, domestic intelligence, and any

\*In his testimony, Jones also clarified and corrected the errors that appeared in communications that were generated as a result of the activities of his military intelligence unit.

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special operations in this five-state area. He believes that Oswald first came to his attention in mid-1963 through information provided to the 112th MIG by the New Orleans Police Department to the effect that Oswald had been arrested there in connection with Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities. As a result of this information, the 112th Military Intelligence Group took an interest in Oswald as a possible counterintelligence threat. The Group collected information from local agencies and the military central records facility, and opened a file under the names Lee Harvey Oswald and A. J. Hidell. Placed in this file were documents and newspaper articles on such topics as Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, his travels there, his marriage to a Russian national, his return to the United States, and his pro-Cuba activities in New Orleans.

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Jones related that on November 22, 1963, while in his quarters at Fort Sam Houston, he heard about the assassination of President Kennedy. Returning immediately to his office, he contacted MIG personnel in Dallas and instructed them to intensify their liaisons with federal, state, and local agencies and to report back any information obtained. Early that afternoon, he received a telephone call from Dallas advising that an A.J. Hidell had been arrested or had come to the attention of law enforcement authorities. Jones checked the MIG indices, which indicated that there was a file on Lee Harvey Oswald, also known by the name A.J. Hidell. Pulling the file, he telephoned the local FBI office in San Antonio to notify the FBI that he had some information. He soon was in telephonic contact with the Dallas FBI office, to which he summarized the documents in the file. He believes that one

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person with whom he would have spoken was FBI Special Agent  
in Charge J. Gordon Shanklin. He may have talked with the  
Dallas FBI office more than one time that day.

Jones testified that his last activity with regard  
to the Kennedy assassination was to write an "after action"  
report, which summarized the actions he had taken, the people  
he had notified, and the times of notification. In addition,  
Jones believes that this "after action" report included  
information obtained from reports filed by the eight to  
twelve Military Intelligence agents who performed liaison  
functions with the Secret Service in Dallas on the day of the  
assassination. This "after action" report was then maintained  
in the Oswald file. Jones did not contact, nor was he  
contacted by, any other law enforcement or intelligence agencies  
concerning information which he could provide on Oswald. To

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Jones' knowledge, neither the FBI nor any law enforcement agency ever requested a copy of the Military Intelligence file on Oswald. To his surprise, neither the FBI, Secret Service, CIA nor Warren Commission ever interviewed him. No one ever directed him to withhold any information; on the other hand, he never came forward and offered anyone further information relevant to the assassination investigation because he "felt that the information that he had provided was sufficient and...a matter of record..."

Communications

Jones' contact with the FBI office in San Antonio is reflected in a teletype message sent at 4:25 p.m. on November 22, 1963, from that FBI office to the FBI Director and the Special Agent in Charge in Dallas.

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The Committee found Jones' testimony to be very credible. His statements concerning the contents of the Oswald file are consistent with FBI communications that were generated as a result of the information which he initially provided. Access to Oswald's Military Intelligence file, which the Department of Defense never gave to the Warren Commission, was not possible because the Department of Defense had destroyed the file as part of a general program aimed at eliminating all of its files pertaining to nonmilitary personnel. In response to a Committee inquiry, the Department of Defense gave the following explanation for the file's destruction:

1. 'Dossier AB 652876, OSWALD, Lee Harvey, was identified for deletion from IRR (Intelligence Records and Reports) holdings on Julian date 73060 (1 March 1973) as stamped on the micro-filmed dossier cover. It is not possible to determine the actual date when physical destruction was accomplished, but is credibly surmised that the destruction was accomplished within a period not greater than sixty days following the identification for deletion.

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Evidence such as the type of deletion record available, the individual clerk involved in the identification, and the projects in progress at the time of deletion, all indicate the dossier deletion resulted from the implementation of a Department of the Army, Adjutant General letter dated 1 June 1971, subject: Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense (DOD) (Incl 1). Basically, the letter called for the elimination of files on non-DOD affiliated persons and organizations.

2. It is not possible to determine who accomplished the actual physical destruction of the dossier. The individual identifying the dossier for deletion can be determined from the clerk number appearing on the available deletion record. The number indicates that Lyndall E. Harp was the identifying clerk. Harp was an employee of the IRR from 1969 until late 1973, at which time she transferred to the Defense Investigative Service, Fort Holabird, Maryland, where she is still a civil service employee. The individual ordering the destruction or deletion cannot be determined. However, available evidence indicates that the dossier was identified for deletion under a set of criteria applied by IRR clerks to all files. The basis for these criteria were established in the 1 June 1971 letter. There is no indication that the dossier was specifically identified for review or deletion. All evidence shows that the file was reviewed as part of a generally applied program to eliminate any dossier concerning persons not affiliated with DOD.

3. The exact material contained in the dossier cannot be determined at this time. However, discussions with all available persons who recall seeing the dossier reveal that it most probably included: newspaper clippings relating to pro-Cuban activities of Oswald, several Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, and possibly some Army counterintelligence reports. None of the persons indicated that they remember any

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significant information in the dossier. It should be noted here that the Army was not asked to investigate the assassination. Consequently, any Army derived information was turned over to the appropriate civil authority.

4. At the time of the destruction of the Oswald dossier, IRR was operating under the records disposal authority contained in the DOD Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments, OASD(A), 9 February 1972, subject: Records Disposal Authority (Incl 2). The memorandum forwards National Archivist disposal criteria which is similar in nature to the requirements outlined in the 1 June 1971 instructions. It was not until 1975 that the Archivist changed the criteria to ensure non-destruction of investigative records that may be of historical value. \_/

Upon receipt of this information, the Committee orally requested the destruction order relating to the file on Oswald. In a letter dated September 13, 1978, the General Counsel of the Department of the Army replied that no such order existed:

Army regulations do not require any type of specific order before intelligence files can be destroyed, and none was prepared in connection with the destruction of the Oswald file. As a rule, investigative information on persons not directly affiliated with the Defense Department can be retained in Army files only for short periods of time and in carefully regulated circumstances. The Oswald file

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was destroyed routinely in accordance with normal  
files management procedures, as are thousands of  
intelligence files annually. \_/

The Committee finds this "routine" destruction of the  
Oswald file extremely troublesome, especially when viewed in  
light of the Department of Defense's failure to make this file  
available to the Warren Commission. Despite the credibility  
of Jones' testimony, without access to this file the question  
of Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence  
cannot be fully resolved. The absence of this file, however,  
has no bearing upon the Committee's conclusion concerning  
the absence of any relationship between Lee Harvey Oswald  
and the CIA.

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